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Abstract. This paper analyses the effects of globalization, stricter intellectual property rights
protection and different labor market policies in a dynamic North-South general equilibrium
model with non-scale growth. To this aim, we generalize the Schumpeterian product-lifecycle
model of Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2003) by adding frictional unemployment and firing
costs to their framework. We find that the effects on North-South wage inequality, employ-
ment and growth depend qualitatively on the level of Northern firing costs. Contrary to the
special case of perfect labor market flexibility studied by Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, glob-
alization may not benefit anymore both the South in terms of a relative-wage catch up and the
North in terms of a temporary innovation and growth push.
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For many people in Northern developed countries, a major concern of the current wave of “globaliza-
tion” is the rising competition from low-wage Southern developing countries. In particular, the adop-
tion of more liberal international trade laws by large countries like China and India seems to threaten
Northern employment in import-competing industries. In addition, rising imitation of innovative
Northern products by Southern countries seems to threaten technical progress and growth in the North.
Another major concern of globalization critics in the North is that Southern developing countries,
while hoping to catch up in terms of growth and living standards through integration into world mar-
kets, will actually lose in terms of well-being of their workers (e.g., due to poor working conditions).
Hence the worst-case scenario of globalization is that is leads, on the one hand, to rising unemploy-
ment and declining growth in the North and, on the other hand, to rising North-South income inequal-
ity (by declining Southern wages rather than rising Northern wages).
1
Among economists, the majority view is that globalization will almost surely help the South to
raise their living standards, even relative to the North, and that Northern countries with more flexible
labor markets will be better prepared to adjust to rising competition from the South. In particular, the
view is that in Northern countries with severe labor market rigidities, globalization forces will ulti-
mately result in an innovation and growth problem in addition to rising unemployment.
2 To our best
knowledge, a question rarely (if ever before) asked in a formal model is whether the degree of North-
ern labor market rigidities somehow drives the nature of the effects of globalization not only on
Northern employment and growth, but also on the wage rate of Southern relative to Northern workers.
The idea of this paper is therefore to analyze the interaction of globalization pressure coming from the
South and several labor market rigidities in the North.
Our basic framework is taken from Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2003), henceforth referred to as
DS. They develop a North-South neo-Schumpeterian product-lifecycle model with non-scale endoge-
nous growth. Globalization takes the form of the entry of a large Southern developing country (the
“newly industrialized South”) into the world free-trade markets, where new Southern firms compete
with the established Northern firms on the markets for qualitatively diversified consumer goods. The
                                                          
1  See Deardorff (2003) for an insightful discussion of the various charges against globalization by its critics and
their supposed underlying views of the world. More specifically, Segerstrom (2003) debunks the flaws in the
arguments of one of the leaders in the anti-globalization movement, Naomi Klein.
2  Arnold (2002a) analyses the effects of rising Southern imitation in a North-South product-cycle model on
Northern growth and unemployment, and how these effects depend on the degree of Northern labor market
flexibility. He finds that for a high (low) degree of labor market flexibility, rising Southern imitation stimu-
lates (impedes) Northern growth, whereas for an intermediate degree of labor market flexibility, this relation-
ship is hump-shaped. Furthermore, whenever rising Southern imitation reduces Northern growth, it also raises
Northern unemployment. Arnold’s model differs from our setting in two important respects. First, we analyze
a non-scale growth model, whereas his model belongs to the first generation of endogenous growth models
and hence displays scale effects. Second, we fully model the consumption and production side of the Southern
economy, and thereby we derive the Southern imitation rate endogenously.2
entry of the South is formally modeled as a discontinuous rise in the Southern population size in this
two-country general equilibrium framework. On the one hand, this form of globalization improves in-
centives for Northern quality follower firms to engage in R&D by raising the market size to which
these firms (once becoming quality leaders) can sell their products. On the other hand, this form of
globalization “steals the business” of established Northern quality leader firms whose products are
driven from the world market since they are imitated at a lower wage cost by new Southern quality
leaders. With intersectoral mobility of workers on perfectly flexible labor markets, the flow of pro-
duction jobs from the North to the low-wage South implies that more Northern workers are available
for doing R&D in quality follower firms, which results in a temporary rise in the Northern innovation
and growth rate above its steady-state level. Since R&D difficulty rises with the innovation rate, this
positive growth effect peters out in the long run, and the steady-state rates of innovation and growth
are not affected. Finally, since globalization raises the reward for Southern imitation by more than the
reward for Northern innovation, the relative Southern wage rate increases in the new North-South
steady-state trade equilibrium. Therefore, DS (2003) depict a rather positive (best-case) scenario of
globalization: it benefits both the North in terms of a temporary innovation and growth push and the
South in terms of a rising wage rate (absolute and relative to the North), which decreases global in-
come inequality. Thus, when viewed from the perspective of the model of DS (2003), both charges
against globalization by its critics we referred to above seem to be unjustified.
The analysis in DS (2003) is very valuable for at least two reasons. First, this is among the first
analytically tractable North-South non-scale growth models with endogenous Southern imitation that
allows to analyze globalization effects in general equilibrium. Second, although necessarily highly
stylized, it captures well the main economic forces currently at work, where newly industrialized
countries enter the world markets for qualitatively diversified products. These economic forces tend to
be overlooked by many globalization critics, and thus DS (2003) is a very useful template to start fur-
ther robustness analysis.
However, the positive scenario of globalization in DS (2003) may hinge crucially on the assump-
tion of a frictionless Northern labor market. This paper therefore asks whether their results change
qualitatively for different degrees of Northern labor market rigidity. To this aim, we generalize their
model by adding frictional unemployment of Northern workers as in Arnold (2002a) and firing costs
for Northern firms as in Grieben (2004). We find three important things: first, the results of DS (2003)
are not robust – in particular, they change qualitatively for relative large firing costs (in particular,
relative to the wage component of total Northern R&D costs). Second, the degree of Northern labor
market rigidities not only affects the propagation mechanism of a Southern globalization shock in the
North, but it also affects the Southern imitation rate and the net effect on the Southern relative wage
rate in general equilibrium. Third, instead of a unique steady-state equilibrium as in DS, our model has
usually two steady-state equilibria, and qualitatively different policy conclusions follow for each of
them.3
More specifically, in our extended model we derive the main results of DS (2003) as a special
case which applies for low enough firing costs and a sufficiently flexible Northern labor market. With
firing costs exceeding a critical level, our model has usually two qualitatively different steady-state
equilibria. The first is referred to as the “poor-South equilibrium”. This is characterized by a low level
of Southern imitation and a low relative Southern wage rate, and it has the same policy implications as
the unique steady-state equilibrium analyzed in DS (2003). In addition to the results of DS, globaliza-
tion raises unambiguously Northern unemployment in this case, which somewhat qualifies the “best-
case scenario”. The second steady-state equilibrium is referred to as the “rich-South equilibrium”. This
is characterized by a high level of Southern imitation and a high relative Southern wage rate. There,
some of the findings of DS are exactly reversed, and the effect on Northern unemployment is ambigu-
ous. In particular, in the rich-South equilibrium, globalization never benefits both the South in terms of
a relative-wage catch up and the North in terms of a temporary innovation and growth push. Moreo-
ver, as in DS, stricter intellectual property rights protection (IPRP) for Northern innovating firms tends
to alleviate the effects of globalization – however, the effects are as case-sensitive as those of global-
ization. We also obtain the (at first sight) counterintuitive result that in the rich-South equilibrium,
stricter IPRP even raises the Southern imitation rate (termed “IPRP paradox”).
Furthermore, we analyze the effects of a more flexible Northern labor market (more efficient
matching between firms and unemployed workers), rising R&D subsidies in the North and declining
firing costs. Starting from any level of firing costs, we find that in the poor-South equilibrium, all of
these policies result in a temporary innovation and growth push in the North but declining Southern
imitation and rising North-South wage inequality. In the rich-South equilibrium, these effects are ex-
actly reversed.
With large developing countries like China and India about to enter the open world markets for
qualitatively diversified products
3, we are confident that our new results are highly relevant for dis-
cussing Northern and Southern gains and losses from globalization. In particular, it appears to be an
empirical regularity that employment protection and openness are positively correlated. Using the job
protection index of Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and the measure of openness from Penn World Ta-
bles, Mark 5.6, Agell (2002) shows that within a sample of 20 OECD countries between the early
1960s and the late 1970s, “[...] job protection increased the most in those countries that got the most
open” (ibid, p. 129).
4 As argued in this paper, a high level of job protection (captured by firing costs)
                                                          
3  Wacziarg and Welch (2003) use an updated Sachs-Warner index to determine whether developing countries
must be classified as “open” or “closed”, based on the well-known five Sachs-Warner criteria averaged over
the 1990s. Based in this index, both China and India are still closed but approach progressively the threshold
of becoming open. China “[r]emains closed based on the undivided power of the Communist Party and its
black market exchange rate premium, which averaged 36% between 1990-1999” (ibid, p. 41). India “did not
satisfy the tariff openness criteria until 1996 when its average tariff rate fell from 41.0% to 38.6%”, and “In-
dia’s nontariff barriers have been recently reduced below the 40% coverage rate, although these measures
seem to have been replaced with a flurry of phytosanitary measures and antidumping duties” (ibid, p. 43).
4  A theoretical reasoning for why the voter's demand for employment protection rises with increasing openness4
in open Northern economies is likely to be relevant for the effects of globalization shocks coming
from the South.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the building blocks of the
model, which comprises household behavior, product markets, Northern innovation, Southern imita-
tion, and labor market equilibrium conditions. Section 3 derives the multiple steady-state equilibria.
We also derive the critical level of firing costs that determines the distinction between the special DS
(2003)-case and the existence of multiple equilibria (with a poor-South and a rich-South equilibrium)
in our generalization. In section 4 we derive our main results. We analyze the effects of globalization,
stricter IPRP, and various labor market policies in the North on the Northern innovation rate, Northern
unemployment, Southern imitation, and North-South wage inequality. Finally, section 5 offers some
conclusions, whereas proofs and technical details are relegated to three appendices.
2 The Model
2.1  Household Behavior
The household side of our model combines the basic structure of DS (2003) with Arnold’s (2002b)
extension of Segerstrom (1998). In both countries, there is a fixed number of households forming a
dynastic family whose individual members have an infinite lifetime. Contrary to DS, the number of
household members is fixed to  N L  in the North and  S L  in the South (there is no population growth).
Instead, following Arnold, each individual is endowed with h(t) units of human capital that can be
used either for additional human capital accumulation in the sense of Lucas (1988), or for supplying
labor (in goods production or in R&D, to be specified later). Initial levels of human capital at t = 0
(hN,0 in the North, hS,0 in the South
5) may differ, but for reasons to become clear later, we require equal
rates of human capital accumulation in both countries (DS assume equal rates of population growth in-
stead). The accumulation equation for human capital is
   he hh h ηδ =⋅ − ⋅ !  , (1)
where ηh > 0 is an education productivity parameter, he < h is the fraction of human capital endowment
that is used for further schooling, and δ > 0 is the depreciation rate.
6
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(more generally, why it increases along with positive shocks that ceteris paribus tend to raise the steady-state
innovation and growth rate) is provided in Grieben (2004).
5  Subscripts “N” and “S” indicating Northern and Southern variables or constants will usually be avoided in
equations that hold for both countries.
6  As discussed by Mauro and Carmeci (2003), this form of human capital accumulation neglects the learning-
by-doing part (work experience), because human capital used for labor supply is negatively correlated with
the production of new personalized knowledge. Accounting for the work-experience part would imply that
unemployment reduces the rate of human capital accumulation.5
Households in North and South have the same preferences and maximize discounted lifetime
utility
0
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with constant time-preference rate ρ > 0 and individual instantaneous CES-utility function
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Equation (3) is a quality-augmented Dixit-Stiglitz consumption index, where d(j, ω, t) is the quantity
of a vertically differentiated good with j improvements of its quality in industry ω consumed at time t,
λ > 1 is the size of each quality improvement in case of successful innovation, and σ > 1 is the constant
elasticity of substitution between products across industries. As is a standard result in neo-
Schumpeterian growth theory, within industries, consumers only consume products with the lowest
quality-adjusted price, hence in (3), the sum over qualities j vanishes. Across industries, consumers
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In (4), t is fixed, d(ω, t) is the individual’s quantity demanded of the product with the lowest quality-
adjusted price in industry ω at time t, j(ω, t) (p(ω, t)) is the quality index (price) of this good, and ct is
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where q(ω, t) ≡ λ
j(ω,t) measures product quality (of the good with the lowest quality-adjusted price) in
industry ω at time t. The intertemporal budget constraint of a household is
,,    tt t t y t e t e t t ar a w hs w h c =⋅+⋅ +⋅⋅ − !  , (6)
where a is per-capita asset holdings, r is the market interest rate, w is the wage rate (which is the same
for all production and R&D workers within a country due to the assumptions of perfect mobility
across industries and between activities; however, due to the assumption of international labor immo-
                                                          
7  Apart from DS (2003), the same type of preferences is assumed in e.g. Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998) and
Li (2001, 2003).
8  See Appendix A for a derivation.6
bility, Northern and Southern wage rates usually differ), hy < h is the fraction of human capital used
for goods production, and se ≥ 0 is the education subsidy paid by the government as a constant fraction
of forgone wage income. Inserting (3) and (5) into (2) yields the household’s optimization problem
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Note two things here: first, since the individual household takes prices and the evolution of prod-
uct quality as given, the large second expression in curly brackets in (7) can be neglected for doing the
optimization. Second, the individual human capital endowment constraint h = he + hy has to be distin-
guished from the economywide constraint h = he + hy + hI , where hI is the amount of human capital
supplied per R&D worker (the individual worker can only supply human-capital augmented labor to
either production or R&D). The current-value Hamiltonian (with suppressed time-indices for simplic-
ity) then looks like in Arnold (2002b):
() ( ) {} () , ,  ,  ,  ,  ,     ln 1 ea h a e e h h e Jch ah t c ra w h h s c h h µµ µ µη δ =+ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅  − ⋅ − −  + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅   .
The first-order conditions are:
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which hold for both Northern and Southern consumption expenditures per capita, cN and cS. Condi-
tions (9) and (11) together imply  () 1 hh h e s µµ ηδ ρ −= − − − ! , and using this, (10) and log-












  . (14)
In order to solve for the household’s optimal choice of he, we need a normalization wN⋅hN ≡ kN for
the North, with kN > 0 being a constant (given equal rates of human capital accumulation in both
countries, for the South wS⋅hS = ψ⋅kN with ψ > 0 will follow in equilibrium; thus, we will establish that
the relative wage rate wN/wS is a constant). From (1) and ww hh =−! ! , we get he = [hh ! +δ]⋅h/ηh =









=− ⋅  − 
(15)
holds. Hence, the fraction of human capital invested in further schooling rises with education subsidies
se and schooling productivity ηh, but declines with the interest rate because forgone wage income is
more heavily discounted.
2.2  Product Markets, Innovation And Imitation
The industry side of our model is almost identical to DS (2003), hence our description will be as brief
as possible. In any industry ω ∈ [0,1], irrespective of the quality level of the corresponding goods,
output equals human-capital augmented labor input: YN =
Y
NN Lh ⋅  in the North and YS = 
Y
SS Lh ⋅  in the
South (i.e., all production workers L
Y within a country have the same amount of human capital, re-
spectively). We assume LS = S L  (there is full employment in the South) but LN < N L , hence there is un-
employment in the North due to labor market rigidities as will be specified in section 2.3. The R&D
process specified below results in a unique quality leader in each industry who is protected by an ex-
clusive patent on his production technology, and who charges an unconstraint monopoly price derived
below. This patent expires in case of two events: either another innovation (that is, an improvement of
consumer good quality of size λ > 1 in terms of the utility function) occurs in the same industry by a
Northern firm, or the leading technology is imitated by a Southern firm producing at lower marginal
costs wS < wN. In both cases, the previous incumbent immediately leaves the market and cannot credi-
bly threaten to reenter (due to positive costs of reentering the market and zero profits in an equilibrium
with Bertrand price competition). In the North, the current quality leader maximizes global monopoly
profits πN = (pN − wN)⋅(dN⋅LN + dS⋅ S L ) with respect to the price pN, where Northern and Southern de-
mand functions are given by (5), respectively.
9 It results the unconstraint monopoly price pN = [σ/(σ −
1)]⋅wN in each industry with a Northern quality leader. Similarly, the successful Southern imitating
firm maximizes global monopoly profits πS = (pS − wS)⋅(dN⋅LN + dS⋅ S L ) with respect to the price pS,
                                                          
9  Note that Northern unemployed workers do not generate a positive demand since we abstract from unem-
ployment benefits for simplicity.8
which results in the monopoly price pS = [σ/(σ − 1)]⋅wS in each industry with a Southern quality leader.
We follow the notation in DS (2003) by denoting  ()
 1
 0 , t Qq t d ωω ≡∫  the average quality level across
industries (some of which are producing in the North, some in the South) at time t, E ≡ cN⋅LN + cS⋅ S L
the global consumption expenditure, and c = E/(LN + S L ) the global per-capita consumption expendi-




















  , (16)
and the Southern equivalent  S d  is found by simply replacing pN by pS in the nominator of (16). It fol-
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 , (17)
which is the product of profit margin, total market size, and product quality relative to the average.
The Southern equivalent πS(ω) is found by simply replacing wN and  N d  in (17) by wS and  S d .
Now we will consider Northern innovative and Southern imitative R&D activities. The R&D
production function of a Northern innovating firm in industry ω is
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=   , (18)
where Ii is a Poisson arrival rate, ηI > 0 is an R&D productivity parameter, and  ,
I
Ni L  is labor input of
firm i (with each worker being endowed with the Northern human capital level hN), with  ,
II
Ni N iLL = ∑
being the total number of Northern R&D workers. The quality level q(ω, t) = λ
j(ω,t) in the denominator
captures the idea that with rising product quality (thus with each innovation success), further im-
provement becomes increasingly difficult since products become more complex. Hence, an ever in-
creasing amount of (in this case, human-capital augmented) R&D labor is needed to maintain a con-
stant innovation rate Ii.
10 R&D returns are assumed to be independently distributed across firms, in-
dustries and over time, hence the industry-wide instantaneous probability of innovation is I(ω) =
()
I
INN Lhq ηω ⋅⋅ . Similarly, the Poisson arrival rate of Southern imitating firm j is defined as
                                                          
10 The principle underlying idea was first formalized in a neo-Schumpeterian growth model by Segerstrom
(1998). The specification in (18) is a special case, also considered in DS (2003), of the more general formula-
tion in Li (2003, p. 1010).9
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with R&D productivity parameter ηC > 0, and  ,
CC
Sj S jLL = ∑  being the total number of Southern R&D
workers. Note that 1/ηC can also be viewed as a measure of the strictness of international property
rights protection (IPRP for short). R&D difficulty of Southern copying is identical to Northern R&D
difficulty because the technical knowledge for how to produce a particular quality of a given con-
sumption good is the same.
Due to the assumption wN > wS > wN/λ
1/(σ−1), an imitation not only implies that the successful
Southern firm replaces the previous Northern incumbent and serves the world market, but also that in
case of a further innovation, the new Northern quality leader replaces the previous Southern monopo-
list in turn, which closes the Vernon-type product cycle. Denoting mN (mS) the fraction of industries
with a Northern (Southern) quality leader, in a steady state with constant I and C, the flow of indus-
tries ω with a new Southern quality leader must equal the flow of industries with a new Northern
quality leader, thus mN⋅C = mS⋅I holds. With mN + mS = 1, it follows mN = I/(I + C) and mS = C/(I + C).
Northern firms optimally choose R&D intensity Ii as to maximize expected benefits minus costs
from engaging in R&D: vI(ω)⋅Ii − (1−sR)⋅wN⋅
I
N L ⋅hN, where vI(ω) is the reward for innovating (deter-
mined below), and sR ≥ 0 is an R&D subsidy. With free entry to R&D races, optimal R&D investment
satisfies
() ( ) ()    1 IR N I vs w q ωω η =−⋅⋅  . (20)
Since product quality q(ω) stays constant during an R&D race, vI grows at the rate of wN given in (14).
The usual no-arbitrage condition on the world stock market equates the return from a completely
diversified portfolio of the stocks of Northern R&D firms and the save interest rate for a riskless bond,
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All terms are standard for neo-Schumpeterian growth models except for the third term on the LHS
taken from Grieben (2004). We specify that in addition to suffering from full capital loss in case of
either further Northern innovation or Southern imitation, the previous Northern incumbent firm has to
pay firing costs, defined as F ≡ B⋅wN⋅q(ω) with B > 0 being a constant, each time it is replaced from
the goods market and thus is forced to dismiss its workers. Firing costs are indexed to wN⋅q(ω) in order
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 . (22)
We will later analyze how B must be bounded from above to ensure the existence of an equilib-
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 . (23)
The LHS is related to the expected discounted benefit from innovating, which rises with a larger mar-
ket size and decreases with a higher elasticity of substitution between products (implying a lower
markup price) as well as with a higher probability of being removed from the market via further inno-
vation or imitation. The RHS is related to the expected discounted cost of innovating, which rises with
higher average product quality (implying higher R&D difficulty), lower R&D subsidies or R&D pro-
ductivity, a higher discounted wage growth rate
11, and higher firing costs.
Similarly, Southern firms optimally choose R&D intensity Cj as to maximize expected benefits
minus costs from engaging in R&D: vC(ω)⋅Cj − wS⋅
C
S L ⋅hS, where vC(ω) is the reward for imitating.
With free entry to R&D races, optimal R&D investment satisfies
() ()    CS C vw q ωω η =⋅  , (24)
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similar to (17), with  () SNN S ddp p
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  . (27)
Then, from equations (24), (26) and (27) together we can determine the Southern “steady-state imita-
                                                          
11 Note that due to our normalization wN⋅hN ≡ kN, the wage growth rate in (14) is negative, hence δ < ηh/(1−se) in
(23). This has to be discounted because after further innovation or imitation occurs, the firm shuts down and
thus no wages have to be paid anymore.
12 Note that no Southern firm would engage in copying products with a Southern quality leader, because Ber-
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Similar to (23), the LHS (RHS) is related to the expected discounted benefit (cost) of imitating. The
interpretation of terms is similar to before, with the wage growth rate now depreciating the benefit of
imitation.
2.3  Quality Dynamics And Labor Markets
Before determining the labor market equilibrium for both countries, we need to derive (thereby repro-
ducing results of DS, 2003) how product quality evolves in North and South, because this is closely
related to the demand for production workers. From the definition  ()
()  1 1 ,
 0 0 ,
jt
t Qq t d d
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+  = − ⋅ ⋅=− ⋅ ⋅ =− ⋅ ⋅  ∫∫
! (29)
since product quality jumps up from λ
j to λ
j+1 with each innovation that occurs with constant instanta-
neous probability I. As derived in DS (2003), in a steady state, a constant growth rate of Northern
(Southern) average product quality  ()   N NN N m Qm q d m ωω ≡∫  ( ()   S SS S m Qm q d m ωω ≡∫ ) requires
equal growth rates  NN SS QQ QQ = !! . Moreover, it holds
















From this and the industry fractions mN and mS derived before, it follows QN/mN = (QS/mS)⋅λ, i.e. aver-
age Northern product quality exceeds average Southern product quality by exactly one quality jump of
size λ.
13
Now, we introduce frictional unemployment into the model of DS (2003). This is done similar to
Arnold (2002a; see his motivation on pp. 455-56) by assuming that Northern production workers not
only lose their jobs because of Southern imitation (which forces the previous Northern incumbent to
shut down), but it also takes time to reenter the labor market. More precisely, the unemployed produc-
tion worker’s instantaneous probability of re-entering the Northern labor market equals an exoge-
nously fixed constant β > 0, which implies an expected duration 1/β of unemployment.
14 This means
                                                          
13 This latter result makes clear that the South in our model should not be thought of as an economically back-
ward low-developed country, but rather as a newly industrializing country that closely follows the Northern
(quality-)growth path.
14 A microeconomically founded version of frictional unemployment within a neo-Schumpeterian growth model
is developed by Şener (2001) and used in Grieben (2004). The simpler version used here is more tractable12
that Northern employment LN <  N L  follows
()   
Y
NN N N LL L C L β =⋅ − − ⋅ !   . (31)
The only difference to Arnold (2002a) with respect to (31) is that the imitation rate is endogenous
here. Note in particular that in case of Northern innovation, production workers of the previous in-
cumbent firm are also laid off. However, this does not cause additional frictional unemployment since
we assume that the new incumbent firm instantaneously offers an equal amount of 
Y
N L -type jobs.
15
Goods market clearing implies that global per-capita demand for a Northern product with average
Northern quality must equal Northern supply of goods, hence
() ()
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N L : employed Northern labor times the fraction of Northern human capital per capita used for
labor supply must be equal to effective Northern labor demand in production and R&D. Using 
I
N L ⋅hN
= I⋅Q/ηI from aggregating (18) over all industries ω (since innovative R&D takes place in both indus-
tries with a Northern and a Southern quality leader), (15) and (32) gives
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as the steady-state equilibrium condition for Northern human capital, where we already used the
steady-state result r = ρ which holds due to ċ/c = 0 in (13).
16 In (33), xN ≡ Q/hN is defined as the North-
ern relative R&D difficulty. Since both the LHS and the first term on the RHS of (33) are constant in
steady state, xN must also be a constant. This in turn requires  NN QQ h h = ! ! , which by use of (29),
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Similar to (32), Southern goods market clearing requires
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without changing any of the results qualitatively.
15 By contrast, the case of non-instantaneous matching between new quality leaders and unemployed workers is
covered by Şener (2001) and Grieben (2004).
16 We must have ċ/c = 0 in steady state since we have normalized the wage income of Northern workers to a
constant wN⋅hN ≡ kN. Since (1) applies to both countries, and since we will later show that the relative wage
rate wN/wS is a constant in steady state, it also holds ċN/cN = ċS/cS = 0 in steady state.13




S L , where the
interpretation is the same as given for the North above. Using 
C
S L ⋅hS = C⋅QN/ηC from aggregating (18)
over the measure mN of all industries with a Northern quality leader (because copying takes place only
there), (30), (15), r = ρ, (35) and the definition xN ≡ Q/hN gives
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as the steady-state equilibrium condition for Southern human capital.
3 Multiple Steady-State Equilibria
In this section, we want to solve for a steady-state equilibrium with constant variables LN, I, C, xN, cN,
cS, E,  c , r = ρ, and with growing variables wN, wS (with constant relative wage wN/wS), hN, hS (with
NN hh = !   SS hh = ! ww − ! ),  N d ,  S d , and Q (all three growing at the rate hh ! ). In particular we will
show that, for large enough firing costs, the steady-state equilibrium will usually not be unique. In-
stead, there are two distinct steady-state equilibria with qualitatively different policy implications, as-
sociated with two levels of Southern development. The unique equilibrium of DS (2003) is derived as
a special case with a perfectly flexible labor market (β → ∞) and no firing costs (B = 0).
Equation (31) can be rewritten by solving (32) for 
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which we denote the “Northern unemployment condition”. In steady state,  0 N L = ! , and Northern
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Given I from (34) and  N L "  from (38), the equilibrium conditions (23), (28), (33) and (36) can be re-
duced to a set of two equations in two unknown variables xN and C. To this aim, we divide (23) by hN,
use the definition xN ≡ Q/hN, solve the equation for  NN dh  and plug this together with (38) for LN into
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Note that not only 
I
N L  but also 
Y
N L  is increasing in xN because consumer demand is rising with
product quality. Similarly, solving (28) for  SS dh , using Q/hS = xN⋅hN,0/hS,0, and inserting this into (36)
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Note that the Northern and Southern steady-state conditions in DS (2003) corresponding to (39) and
(40) are obtained for the special case B = 0, β → ∞, sR = se = 0, hh ! = 0 ⇔ ηh = ρ + δ, δ = 0, ht = 1 ∀ t,
with  0 NN SS LL LL n == > !! .
17
Equations (39) and (40), together with (34) and (38), determine the steady state of our economy.
However, since I in (34) is defined solely by exogenous parameters, and  N L "  in (38) is fully deter-
mined by I, xN and C, it suffices to solve (39) and (40) jointly for xN and C. We begin by discussing
(40). This represents a convex, downward-sloping curve in (xN, C)-space that is well-defined for xN
above some critical level K1 as illustrated in Figure 1 below.
18 The interpretation of the negative slope
(restricting attention to the positive quadrant) is the same as in DS (2003). An increase in the Southern
imitation rate C raises both the number of industries mS with a Southern quality leader serving the
world market (which requires an increase in production employment 
Y
S L ) and the number of Southern
R&D workers required. For given human-capital augmented labor supply, this requires xN to decrease
to ensure equilibrium on the market for Southern human capital. The decrease in xN not only reduces
R&D labor needed to maintain a given imitation rate C, but it also reduces  S d  (and thus 
Y
S L ) needed
for Southern monopolists to break even, which can be seen from (28) with both sides divided by hN.
The crucial difference to DS (2003) arises because contrary to their special case considered, the
slope of the Northern steady-state condition (39) is no longer unambiguously positive. To see this, ob-
serve first that the RHS of (39) is increasing in xN. Then, we differentiate the RHS of (39) with respect
to C and get
                                                          
17 Note that we replaced population growth by human capital accumulation with a constant population size. In a
strict sense, our model therefore is not a complete generalization of DS (2003). However, this deviation does
not impact upon any of the following results, in particular, it does not affect our qualitatively different equilib-
rium properties. It only results in a steady-state innovation rate in (34) that can be affected by public policy
(namely, by subsidizing education, as in Arnold, 2002b), whereas DS (2003) belongs to the class of “semi-
endogenous” growth models with exogenously fixed I = n/(λ−1).
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In the model of DS (2003), with B = 0, β → ∞ and sR = 0, there are two steady-state effects of an
increase in C in the North, which are also present in our extension. First, with more Southern copying,
the fraction mN of industries with a Northern quality leader declines, which means that less production
workers 
Y
N L  are needed. For a given supply of workers, these formerly production workers must be
absorbed as R&D workers, and rising R&D employment implies a temporary increase in the innova-
tion rate, which results in a permanently higher level of relative R&D difficulty xN (see footnote 22
below for how the size of this effect depends on sR). Thus, the first effect contributes to a positive
slope of the curve for (39). It is reflected in the term (∂
Y
N L " /∂C)⋅[ N L +(xN⋅I⋅C)/(ηI⋅β)] in (41) with only
the negative part of 
Y
N LC ∂∂ "  in (42) (second term in square brackets).
19 Second, more Southern
copying means a higher effective discount rate on benefits from innovating in (23), which requires a
larger market size for given xN such that the innovating firms break even. Given the total number of
consumers  NS LL + " , this requires an increase in global demand for Northern products with average
quality  N d . Hence, output and demand for production workers 
Y
N L  must increase, which works in the
opposite direction (towards a lower level of xN) to the first effect. Thus, the second effect contributes
to a negative slope of the curve for (39).
20
In our more general case, however, there are two additional steady-state effects of an increase in
C in the North, both working towards a negatively sloped Northern steady-state condition and there-
fore reinforcing the second effect described above. The third effect comes from the fact that more
Southern copying means more dismissals of production workers in the North, which implies higher
expected firing cost payments F⋅C. This raises the costs of innovating in (23). Given xN, this again re-
quires an increase in  N d  so that the innovating firms break even, hence an increase in 
Y
N L  is needed.
Since for given  N L "  this means a required decline in R&D employment 
I
N L , the third effect again
works toward a decline in relative R&D difficulty xN after a rise in Southern copying C. The second
                                                          
























. With ρ > n, the first effect dominates in their case,
which implies a positively sloped Northern steady-state condition.16
and third effect are jointly reflected in the term (
Y
N LC ∂∂ " )⋅ [ N L +(xN⋅I⋅C)/(ηI⋅β)] in (41) with only the
positive part of ∂
Y
N L " /∂C in (42) (first term in square brackets). Note that the third effect is small for
low Southern copying C and for small B but becomes more significant for high levels of C and B since
this means large expected firing costs which enter the innovating firms’ R&D decisions. Finally, the
fourth effect works via the Northern unemployment condition (37). An increase in Southern copying
raises the labor market turnover in the North, which for given expected length of unemployment spells
1/β means a decline in total Northern employment  N L " . This reduces the market size for Northern mo-
nopolists and thus the expected benefits from innovating in (23). To break even, this must be compen-
sated by a rise in  N d , implying an increase in 
Y
N L  and thus a particularly strong decrease in 
I
N L  (since
not only workers are reallocated from R&D to production, but the total employed workforce also
shrinks) and xN. This effect is reflected in the term (
Y
N L " /β)⋅[
Y
N L " +(xN⋅I/ηI)] in (41). It can be shown that
if and only if ∂
Y
N L " /∂C > 0 in (42), then this fourth effect is also the more significant the higher the
level of Southern copying is.
21
As becomes obvious from looking at (41) and (42), for sufficiently large β, there is a critical level
of firing costs B
crit such that for all B > B
crit (B < B
crit), (41) takes a positive (negative) value (hence,
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We see that for a flexible enough labor market (i.e., a high enough β), there surely exist a B
crit > 0. In
the case of a perfectly flexible Northern labor market (β → ∞), B
crit takes the value that ensures
∂
Y
N L " /∂C = 0 in (42). 
Y
N L "  in (43) is itself an increasing function of B, and we show in Appendix B that
this equation can equivalently be rewritten as
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21 The intuition for this finding is that if more Southern copying leads to more Northern production employment
(and thus we have a high stock of production workers at high levels of C), an additional increase in C would
imply a large amount of dismissals. Hence, the negative market size effect for Northern monopolists would be
particularly large. Formally, the condition for this result is ∂
2(C⋅
Y
N L " /β)/∂C
2 > 0 in (38). Calculating this second
derivative and applying (34) reveals that this is equivalent to the condition ∂
Y
N L " /∂C > 0 in (42), which in turn
requires B⋅I⋅(λ−1) > (1−sR)⋅ρ/ηI, hence firing costs B must lie sufficiently above B
crit given in (43). With such
high firing costs, dismissals are particularly costly for Northern monopolists, which is taken into account by
innovating follower firms, implying low R&D investment and thus relatively more production workers.17
Equation (44) defines for given policy parameters sR and se, and for given model parameters ηI, ηh, ρ,
δ, λ and β, the levels of firing costs B and Southern imitation C at which the slope of the Northern
steady-state condition (39) is infinite, i.e. a marginal change in C does not affect xN at B = B
crit. This
combination is unique: first, for given C, equation (44) defines B = B
crit uniquely since the LHS of (44)
is a positive constant (given a large enough β), whereas the RHS is strictly increasing in B.
22 Second,
we show in Appendix B that for given B, only one level of Southern copying C is satisfying (44).
Taken together, our discussion of the Northern steady-state condition (39) reveals that for suffi-
ciently large (small) firing costs B ≥  B  > B
crit (B < B
crit), this curve will be downward (upward) slop-
ing in the entire positive (xN, C)-quadrant, whereas for B
crit < B < B , there will be two differently-
sloped segments, with the turning point defined by (44). As illustrated in panel B of Figure 1 below
(drawn for the interesting case B > B
crit), with rising B, the curve for the Northern steady-state condi-
tion (39) shifts inward, and the turning point is reached for lower C.  B  is defined as that level of fir-
ing costs at which the turning point of (39) is reached for C = 0, given all other parameters.
                                                          
22 Taking se as given, and sR and B as policy parameters, we see that for given C, a continuum of (sR, B)-
combinations satisfies (44). Note also that for R&D subsidies sR close to one, B = B
crit is close to zero. In
equations (41) and (42), this means that the first effect described above of an increase in Southern imitation
on the Northern steady-state condition (39) becomes very small – employment changes in the Northern R&D
sector induced by rising Southern imitation have only a marginal effect on R&D costs. This can be seen from
the RHS of the steady-state innovative R&D condition (23): for high sR, the decline in R&D costs induced by
an increase in C [remember that δ < ηh/(1−se)] is relative small. Therefore, innovation incentives improve




























Figure 1: Two Steady-State Equilibria for B
crit < B < B18
In panel A of Figure 1, we show the case of two steady-state equilibria E0 and E1 in the positive
(xN, C)-quadrant
23: at these two points, both the Northern and the Southern steady-state conditions are
fulfilled. However, we may also have one equilibrium (tangent point of both steady-state conditions)
or none at all. For obvious reasons, we will restrict attention to the case of two equilibria from now. In
panel B of Figure 1, we show how the curve for the Northern steady-state condition (39) shifts if firing
costs B increase successively, with the turning points 1, 2, 3 shifting downwards (at point 3, B = B ).
Panel A of Figure 1 also illustrates the dynamics of the adjustment process toward both steady-
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where φ1 > 0 and φ2 > 0 are standard velocity of convergence parameters. E.g., we assume that when
the relative R&D difficulty xN is below its steady-state level  N x "  for a given level C of Southern copy-
ing at any point in time t, then xN increases (thus, incentives for innovating improve) until  N x " = xN
holds again. Similarly, the rate of Southern copying is assumed to converge toward its steady-state
value C "  for any given level of relative R&D difficulty xN at any point in time t. We see from the left
panel of Figure 1 that equilibrium E1 is stable only along a saddle path, whereas the equilibrium at E0
is globally stable for all starting values below this saddle path.
Given the steady-state solution (xN, C) in either E0 or E1, all other variables are also determined. I
is determined by exogenous parameters in (34),  N L "  is determined by xN and C in (38). Given hN,0
(hS,0), the entire growth path of hN (hS) is defined by (1) together with (15) and r = ρ. With our defini-
tion xN = Q/hN, the equilibrium path for Q is determined by xN and hN. Given  N L " , Q and C,  N d  is de-
fined by (23) and  S d  by (28). As shown by DS (2003), global per-capita consumption expenditure c
is found by noting first that it holds
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23 Inserting (40) into (39) gives a cubic equation which has three roots. The third root (not shown in Figure 1)
implies 0 < xN < K1 and C < 0, which is not economically meaningful.
24 Obviously, this assumes stability rather than proves it. However, our model is far too complex to allow a for-
mal proof of stability, and the assumptions in (45) seem to be rather natural. The same method to analyze sta-
bility can be found in e.g. Etro (2003).19
With pN = [σ/(σ − 1)]⋅wN and pS = [σ/(σ − 1)]⋅wS,  N d  and the wage rates determine c , which then de-
termines global consumption expenditure E = c ⋅(LN + S L ). The paths for the wage rates are given by
the paths for human capital together with our normalization wN⋅hN ≡ kN. It remains to be shown that the
relative wage rate wN/wS is constant in equilibrium as claimed earlier, and for this we again follow DS
(2003). Dividing the Northern steady-state innovative R&D condition (23) by the Southern steady-
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Here, the second equality follows because equation (16), its Southern equivalent and the monopolists’
markup pricing rule give  NS dd = (pS/pN)
σ = (wS/wN)
σ. (46) defines the relative Southern wage rate as
an increasing function of the imitation rate C and firing costs B (hence, it rises whenever the reward
for Southern imitating rises relative to the reward for Northern innovating), thus it is constant in a
steady-state equilibrium. Finally, our assumption wN > wS > wN/λ
1/(σ−1) that is necessary for the postu-
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(47)
to be fulfilled. To complete our description of the steady-state equilibria, we derive the amount of ef-
fective production labor demand relative to effective R&D labor demand in the North as
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In Appendix C, we derive the following steady-state utility growth rate that holds for both coun-
tries:
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Note four things here. First, as in Arnold (2002b), this growth rate can only be influenced by changing
education subsidies se. Second, growth is ultimately tied to human capital accumulation, because this
determines the growth rate of the market size (i.e., of the purchasing power of all consumers) for any
quality leader. In “pure” semi-endogenous growth models like Segerstrom (1998) or DS (2003) where
the steady-state growth rate is fully insensitive to public policy changes, exogenous population growth
instead of human capital growth takes this role. Third,  zz !  is declining in σ (the elasticity of substitu-
tion between products across industries) because for higher σ, markup prices of all quality leaders are
lower, which reduces monopoly profits and therefore expected discounted benefits from innovation
and imitation. With lower R&D intensities in both countries for any given growth rate of human capi-20
tal and R&D difficulty, product quality growth is slower. Fourth, contrary to the first-generation en-
dogenous growth model of Arnold (2002a) that still contains the scale-effect property, a rise in South-
ern imitation has no long-run growth effects in the North. This is because any change in R&D incen-
tives (other than σ) is finally offset by a corresponding change in R&D difficulty in these non-scale
growth models.
4 Policy Analysis
The two steady-state equilibria illustrated in Figure 1 (with B
crit < B < B ) differ qualitatively: the
globally stable equilibrium E0 is characterized by a relatively high R&D difficulty xN = Q/hN (hence,
productivity of Northern human capital in terms of average consumer goods quality is high) and a
relatively low level of Southern copying (hence, average Southern product quality QS is low, see (30),
although Southern R&D employment may actually be high due to the high xN, see (36)) and a low
relative Southern wage rate (since wS/wN and C are positively correlated, see (47)). This equilibrium is
termed the “poor-South equilibrium”. Conversely, the steady-state equilibrium E1 that features saddle-
path stability is characterized by low xN, high C and high wS/wN, and it is therefore termed the “rich-
South equilibrium”.
25
However, a caveat is in order: Figure 1 does not show the transition from a poor-South to a rich-
South equilibrium. Therefore, this kind of graph does not help to visualize how a developing country
‘climbs up’ in terms of growth and the relative wage rate wS/wN.
26 Moreover, either a poor-South or a
rich-South equilibrium can emerge in our model with one and the same Southern country entering the
open world markets. However, Figure 1 illustrates that Northern and Southern parameters together
determine the stage of Southern development as measured by the level of Southern imitation. Even for
given parameters (with B > B
crit), the model features multiple equilibria associated with two levels of
Southern development. Furthermore, Figure 1 allows us to do a steady-state policy analysis which will
reveal qualitatively different conclusions in all three
27 types of steady-state equilibria.
Globalization (a rise in  S L ) implies an outward shift of the curve for the Southern steady-state
condition (40) as shown in Figure 2 below. Note that the same happens in case of an exogenous in-
crease in Southern human capital (a rise in hS,0, given the Northern start-off level hN,0). We first look at
panel A of Figure 2. Starting from E0 (E1), globalization in the poor-(rich-)South equilibrium leads to a
                                                          
25 As can be inferred from Figure 1, there is also the possibility of two steady-state equilibria that are both lo-
cated on the negatively sloped branch of the Northern steady-state condition, see Figure 2 below. There, the
same characterization with respect to xN and C holds true, but as will be discussed later, policy conclusions
with respect to equilibrium E0 differ relative to the case considered here.
26 See Currie et al. (1999) and Arnold (2003) for endogenous growth models that focus on phases of Southern
development (in particular, the switch from imitation to innovation).
27 The third type of steady-state equilibria refers to the situation where E0 lies on the negatively sloped segment
of (39).21
move of the steady-state equilibrium to E0’ (E1’) and thus to a rise in the steady-state level of R&D
difficulty xN and an increase (decrease) in the Southern imitation rate C. The rise in xN = Q/hN means
that in both cases, the growth rate of average product quality exceeds temporarily the long-run steady-
state level given by (29) and (34) as Q ! /Q = [ηh/(1−se)]−ρ−δ. This in turn means that R&D employ-
ment must increase permanently. Starting at the poor-South equilibrium, these additional Northern
R&D workers come from the production sector, because rising Southern imitation leads to a decrease
in the fraction mN = I/(I+C) of industries with a Northern quality leader and thus to a decrease in
Northern production employment (same effect as in DS, 2003). However, starting at the rich-South
equilibrium, this channel does not work since the Southern imitation rate decreases. Here, the other
three effects outlined above that work towards a negatively sloped curve of the Northern steady-state
condition (39) drive the result. First, a lower Southern imitation rate means both a lower discount rate
and lower expected costs C⋅B of dismissals for Northern R&D firms. This raises expected profits so
that they need a smaller market size for given xN to break even, which in turn reduces Northern goods
production and thus production employment. The workers not needed for goods production anymore
are available for R&D which has become more profitable. Second, a lower Southern imitation rate im-
plies lower frictional unemployment in the North, which raises total supply of workers  N L "  available
for both production and R&D.
It remains to explain why the Southern imitation rate declines with rising Southern labor supply
in the rich-South equilibrium. On the one hand, a larger Southern population raises the market size for
Southern quality leaders, thereby raising the expected benefits for imitation (LHS of (28)). On the
other hand, average product quality (and thus R&D difficulty) rises permanently due to the rise in
Northern R&D intensity, which raises the cost of imitation (RHS of (28)). These two effects are also
present in DS (2003), and the net effect is still a rise in imitation incentives. In our more general case,
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Figure 2: Steady-State Effects of Globalization22
bus implies more Northern unemployment due to higher labor market turnover, given the expected du-
ration of unemployment 1/β. This reduces the Northern market size for Southern quality leaders (for-
mally, ∂ N L " /∂C < 0 in (38)) and thus weakens imitation incentives. All three effects are valid no matter
from which steady-state equilibrium we start. However, the first effect is the smaller the higher C is.
This is because  N L "  is small for large C, hence the positive marginal effect of rising  S L  on the ex-
pected discounted benefit of imitating (LHS of (28)) is small. Since C is relatively large in a rich-
South equilibrium, the net effect of globalization on C is negative in this case.
Panel B of Figure 2 shows the possibility of a third type of steady-state equilibrium, with E0 lying
on the negatively sloped branch of the curve for (39). Starting there, globalization leads to an increase
in Southern imitation. This is because there, the positive effect of an increase in  S L  on Southern imi-
tation incentives is reinforced by the decrease in xN (discussed below), and both effects together over-
compensate for the negative imitation incentive that comes from the rise in Northern unemployment.
Relative R&D difficulty xN decreases, which means a temporary decline in the quality-growth rate
QQ !  below its steady-state level, and therefore Northern R&D employment declines permanently.
Hence, starting in this equilibrium, the rise in Northern unemployment (induced by the reduction in
the fraction mN of industries with a Northern quality leader due to a higher C) is reflected by a de-
crease in both production and R&D employment. Innovation activity is discouraged because in this
case, the negative effects of the rise in C on Northern innovation incentives in (23) more than offsets
the positive effect of the initial increase in  S L .
28
Finally, to determine the effects of globalization on the Northern steady-state unemployment rate,
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where (38) has been used. Hence, the Northern unemployment rate u unambiguously rises (declines)
whenever both Southern imitation C and Northern R&D difficulty xN increase (decrease). Bearing in
mind that the level of Southern imitation C and the relative Southern wage rate wS/wN are positively
correlated according to (46), we can summarize our findings in
                                                          
28 The initial increase in  S L  raises expected discounted profits from innovating on the LHS of (23). The induced
rise in C has one positive and two negative effects on innovation incentives. On the one hand, the discount
factor for growing wage payments in the future increases [RHS of (23)], which tends to improve innovation
incentives. This effect tends to be small for large sR (if firms have to pay only a small fraction of R&D labor
costs, they do not care much about a smaller discount rate on future wage payments) and for large B (since for
large firing costs, the wage component of total R&D costs becomes relatively unimportant, too). Large values
for sR and B are exactly the ceteris-paribus conditions for the Northern steady-state condition (39) to have a
negatively sloped segment, see our discussion of (43) and (44). On the other hand, an increase in C reduces
the expected discounted benefits from innovating [LHS of (23)], and it raises Northern unemployment due to
higher labor market turnover, which reduces the Northern market size  N L "  for Northern quality leaders.23
Proposition 1: (i) In the poor-South equilibrium, globalization ( S L ↑) or a rise in the
relative Southern human capital level (hS,0/hN,0↑) leads to a perma-
nent increase in the rate of Southern copying (C ↑), a permanent in-
crease in relative R&D difficulty (xN ↑), a short-run increase in the
innovation and quality-growth rates (I  ↑,  QQ ! ↑) above their
steady-state levels, no change in the long-run innovation rate given
in (34), a permanent decrease in North-South wage inequality
(wN/wS ↓), and an increase in the Northern unemployment rate (u ↑).
(ii) In the rich-South equilibrium, globalization ( S L ↑) or a rise in the
relative Southern human capital level (hS,0/hN,0↑) leads to a perma-
nent decrease (increase) in C and a permanent increase (decrease)
in wN/wS whenever xN increases (decreases). In both cases, the net
effect on u is ambiguous, and globalization never benefits both the
South in terms of a relative-wage catch up and the North in terms of
a temporary innovation and growth push.
Part (i) of Proposition 1 replicates the first main result of DS (2003). However, part (ii) of Propo-
sition 1 establishes that this is not robust in our generalized setting: once one accounts for frictional
unemployment and firing costs in the North, globalization still may but need not reduce North-South
wage inequality. More specifically, in case of B > B
crit and a relatively advanced Southern trading
partner with a high imitation rate C (and therefore a high relative wage wS/wN), the result of DS is re-
versed. Moreover, in case of a Southern trading partner at a medium stage of development (with a me-
dium level of C, illustrated by the E0-equilibrium in panel B of Figure 2), the North may not gain from
globalization in terms of a temporary increase in innovation and growth, depending in particular on the
level of firing costs relative to the other model parameters. Therefore, with B > B
crit, the ‘optimistic’
finding in DS (2003) that globalization benefits both the South (in terms of a catch up of the relative
wage rate wS/wN) and the North (in terms of a temporary growth push that may last for a long time due
to the low speed of convergence that is typically found in non-scale growth models) critically depends
on the steady-state equilibrium from which we start.
Four other policy experiments are worth considering: ηC ↓ (stricter IPRP), sR ↑ (rising R&D sub-
sidies in the North), B ↓ (declining firing costs) and β ↑ (increasing flexibility of the Northern labor
market). We consider first a decrease in ηC, i.e. stricter IPRP in favor of Northern quality leaders, im-
plying a decrease in R&D productivity of Southern firms. By looking at (40) we see that a decrease in
ηC simply works opposite to globalization ( S L ↑) or a rising relative Southern human capital level
(hS,0/hN,0↑), and therefore shifts the curve of (40) in opposite direction. Hence, as in DS (2003), stricter
IPRP serves to moderate the effects of globalization. However, in our generalized setting, the effects
are as case-sensitive as those in Proposition 1. It holds24
Proposition 2: (i) In the poor-South equilibrium, stricter IPRP (ηC ↓) leads to a per-
manent decrease in the rate of Southern copying (C ↓), a permanent
decrease in relative R&D difficulty (xN ↓), a short-run decrease in
the innovation and quality-growth rates (I  ↓,QQ ! ↓) below their
steady-state levels, no change in the long-run innovation rate given
in (34), a permanent increase in North-South wage inequality (wN/wS
↑), and a decrease in the Northern unemployment rate (u ↓).
(ii) In the rich-South equilibrium, stricter IPRP leads to a permanent in-
crease (decrease) in C and a permanent decrease (increase) in
wN/wS whenever xN decreases (increases). In both cases, the net ef-
fect on u is ambiguous, and stricter IPRP never benefits both the
South in terms of a relative-wage catch up and the North in terms of
a temporary innovation and growth push.
Note in particular two important findings. First, the surprising result of DS (2003) that Northern
innovation and growth slows down temporarily with the introduction of stricter IPRP ceases to hold in
case of a Southern trading partner at a medium stage of development on the downward-sloping seg-
ment of the Northern steady-state curve (shift from E0’ to E0 in panel B of Figure 2). There, the decline
in Northern unemployment (due to lower labor market turnover) is reflected by an increase in both
production and R&D employment. Innovation activity is encouraged because in this case, the positive
effects of the decline in C on Northern innovation incentives in (23) more than offsets its negative ef-
fects (see footnote 27 above for a discussion of incentive effects of a change of C).
Second, in the rich-South equilibrium, stricter IPRP even raises the Southern imitation rate (panel
A or B of Figure 2, shift from E1’ to E1)! We refer to this as the “IPRP paradox”. The intuition for this
(apparent) paradox is as follows. On the one hand, a decrease in ηC of course raises the cost of imitat-
ing (RHS of (28)) and therefore tends to reduce C. On the other hand, two positive effects on C arise.
One is that average product quality (and thus R&D difficulty) declines permanently due to the decline
in Northern R&D intensity
29, which reduces the cost of imitation again. The other is that the relative
global demand for Southern goods  S d / N d  rises with declining ηC as can be seen from (46). This is be-
cause with lower R&D productivity of Southern workers, the relative wage rate wS/wN declines, see
again (46), which implies a lower relative price pS/pN for Southern goods. The relative demand shift in
                                                          
29 The decline in 
I
NN I LI x η =⋅ "  is explained similar to the discussion of globalization effects in Figure 2 when
starting from equilibrium E1. An increase in C means a higher discount rate and higher expected costs of dis-
missals for Northern R&D firms. This reduces expected profits such that a larger market size is needed for
given xN to break even, which in turn requires an increase in Northern goods production and thus production
employment. These additional workers must be subtracted from R&D, thus xN decreases. In addition, a higher
C implies higher frictional unemployment in the North, which reduces total labor supply  N L "  available for
both production and R&D.25
favor of Southern goods raises the expected discounted benefit from imitating (LHS of (28)). As can
be seen from (46) or (47), ceteris paribus this second positive effect is larger the higher firing costs B
and Southern imitation rate C are (formally, the relative wage response ∂(wS/wN)/∂ηC > 0 is rising in B
and C). This is explained by noting that Northern steady-state employment  N L "  given in (38) is de-
clining in B and C.
30 Hence, the required increase in  S d  in (28) for a Southern quality leader to break
even is larger. Finally note that C is relatively high at E1’ in Figure 2 (B > B
crit is assumed throughout
our analysis), thus it is there where stricter IPRP leads to an increase in the Southern imitation rate
(whereas the opposite holds true for type-E0’ equilibria).
We now consider the cases of rising R&D subsidies sR, increasing labor market flexibility β and
declining firing costs B (while still assuming B
crit < B < B  to hold thereafter). Figure 3 below shows
the case of rising β which leads to an outward shift of the Northern steady-state curve (39) without af-
fecting the Southern steady-state curve (40). It turns out that the only difference in case of rising sR is
that the abscissa intercept K2 also shifts to the right (in the same way as a decrease in firing costs B
would do in panel B of Figure 1), but this yields the same steady-state results. Also observe that con-
trary to the effects of globalization considered before, there is no qualitative difference between the
cases of one or two equilibria on the negatively-sloped segment of the Northern steady-state condition.
The results do not differ because the curve for the Southern steady-state condition (40) does not shift,
and hence its position relative to curve for the Northern steady-state condition (39) does not matter (as
long as there are two intersections which we keep on assuming).
                                                          
30 As is obvious from (31),  N L "  declines with rising C.  N L "  declines with rising B because a rise in B shifts











Figure 3: Steady-State Effects of Increasing Labor Market Flexibility26
Starting from the poor-South equilibrium E0, an increase in Northern labor market flexibility
leads to a move of the steady-state equilibrium to E0’ and thus to a rise in the steady-state level of
R&D difficulty xN and a decrease in the Southern imitation rate C. The rise in xN = Q/hN means that the
growth rate of average product quality exceeds temporarily the long-run steady-state level Q ! /Q =
[ηh/(1−se)]−ρ−δ. This in turn means that R&D employment must increase permanently. These addi-
tional Northern R&D workers do not come from the production sector, because decreasing Southern
imitation leads to an increase in the fraction mN = I/(I+C) of industries with a Northern quality leader
and thus to an increase in Northern production employment. However, both directly by a larger β and
indirectly by a lower C, total Northern steady-state employment  N L "  given in (38) increases, and this is
used both for additional production and R&D employment.
There are two effects on the Southern imitation rate. On the one hand, the increase in  N L "  en-
larges the Northern market size for Southern quality leaders, which raises expected benefits from imi-
tating (LHS of (28)). The size of this effect critically depends on the level of total Northern employ-
ment  N L " : the lower  N L " , the larger is the marginal effect of an increase in β on employment in (31).
That is, at a high level of Northern unemployment, an increase in labor market flexibility is most ef-
fective for job creation. We see from (38) that  N L "  is high (i.e., unemployment is low) for a low level
of C which we have in the poor-South equilibrium. On the other hand, the rise in relative R&D diffi-
culty increases the cost of imitating (RHS of (28)). In the poor-South equilibrium, the positive effect
on C is relatively weak, hence the negative effect dominates and C further declines. Note that in this
case, the net effects on xN and C (and therefore also the effects on I and wN/wS) are qualitatively identi-
cal to those of either globalization in the rich-South equilibrium as illustrated in Figure 2, or stricter
IPRP in case of a Southern trading partner at a medium stage of development (move from E0’ to E0 in
panel B of Figure 2).
In the rich-South equilibrium, by contrast, starting at E1 where C is relatively high, the positive
effect on C is relatively strong (the marginal effect of reducing β on  N L "  is large) and dominates the
negative one, thus Southern imitation incentives improve further. In this case, the rise in C tends to
offset the positive effect of the rise in β on total Northern employment  N L " . Although a large C implies
a high discount rate on future wage payments (RHS of (23)), this positive effect on Northern innova-
tion incentives is more than outweighed by the negative effect on the expected benefits from innovat-
ing given on the LHS of (23) (large discount factor). Hence, innovation activity is discouraged, thus xN
declines with a more flexible Northern labor market. Note that in this case, the net effects on xN and C
(and therefore also the effects on I and wN/wS) are qualitatively identical to those of either stricter IPRP
in the rich-South equilibrium (opposite move to globalization effects shown in Figure 2), or globaliza-
tion in case of a Southern trading partner at a medium stage of development (move from E0 to E0’ in
panel B of Figure 2). We can summarize our findings in27
Proposition 3: (i) In the poor-South equilibrium, a more flexible Northern labor mar-
ket (β ↑), a rise in R&D subsidies (sR↑) or a decrease in firing costs
(B ↓) lead to a permanent decrease in the rate of Southern copying
(C ↓), a permanent increase in relative R&D difficulty (xN  ↑), a
short-run increase in the innovation and quality-growth rates (I
↑,QQ ! ↑) above their steady-state levels, no change in the long-run
innovation rate given in (34), and a permanent increase in North-
South wage inequality (wN/wS ↑).
(ii) In the rich-South equilibrium, a more flexible Northern labor mar-
ket, a rise in R&D subsidies or a decrease in firing costs lead to a
permanent increase in C, a permanent decrease in xN, a short-run
decrease in I and QQ !  below their steady-state levels, no change in
the long-run innovation rate, and a permanent decrease in North-
South wage inequality.
(iii) With B > B
crit, a more flexible Northern labor market, a rise in R&D
subsidies or a decrease in firing costs never benefit both the South in
terms of a relative-wage catch up and the North in terms of a tempo-
rary innovation and growth push.
As stated in this proposition, a rise in R&D subsidies or a decrease in firing costs have qualita-
tively the same effects as an increase in labor market flexibility. Technically, this is because all these
policies shift the Northern steady-state curve in the same way without affecting the Southern steady-
state curve. Economically, both a rise in sR and a decrease in B imply a decrease in R&D costs given
on the RHS of (23) and therefore stimulate Northern R&D in the same way as an increase in β (which
raises R&D benefits by increasing the Northern workforce on the LHS of (23)). If Northern R&D in-
tensity increases temporarily (which is only true when starting in a poor-South equilibrium), this re-
sults in a higher R&D difficulty level that tends to decrease Southern imitation incentives (RHS of
(28)) as in the case of rising β. Finally, we saw that the positive effects of a rising β on Southern imi-
tation incentives work through an increase in the Northern market size  N L "  for Southern quality lead-
ers (LHS of (28)), and this effect is strongest for a relatively high level of C. Again, this logic works
very similar in the case of rising sR or declining B. For a high level of C, both work particularly effec-
tive towards an increase in Northern employment  N L "  in (38) (formally, ∂
 2
N L " /(∂sR⋅∂C) > 0 and |∂
2
N L " /(∂B⋅∂C)| > 0). Total Northern employment increases with rising sR and declining B because it im-
proves R&D incentives (decline in R&D costs on the RHS of (23)) and thus induces an increase in the
proportion of Northern R&D employment ( /
YI
NN LL ""  declines in (48)). Since only production worker
become unemployed according to (31), this reduces vulnerability of the Northern labor market to
Southern competition and therefore raises  N L " . To see that this effect is stronger for high C, multiply28
both sides of (23) by (C + I). Then it is obvious that the marginal effect of a rise in sR or a decline in B
for reducing R&D costs is larger for a high level of C.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we generalize the contribution of DS (2003) in order to analyze whether globalization ef-
fects on growth, employment and North-South wage inequality depend qualitatively on the level of
Northern labor market rigidity and firing costs. Whereas the simpler model of DS with perfectly flexi-
ble labor markets predicts a “best-case” scenario of globalization (a temporary innovation and growth
push in the North and a declining North-South wage gap), we show that a rigid Northern labor market
may overturn this optimistic view. With firing costs below a critical level, the best-case scenario is
preserved (although frictional unemployment arises), but for larger firing costs, two steady-state equi-
libria with qualitatively different properties emerge. In the “poor-South equilibrium” (with a low rate
of Southern imitation and a large North-South wage gap), globalization effects still follow the best-
case scenario. However, in the “rich-South equilibrium” (with a high rate of Southern imitation and a
small North-South wage gap), globalization never benefits both the South in terms of a relative-wage
catch up and the North in terms of a temporary innovation and growth push, whereas the effect on
Northern unemployment is ambiguous.
As in DS (2003), stricter IPRP serves to mitigate the effects from globalization. However, since
those effects tend to be uncertain due to multiple equilibria with qualitatively different policy implica-
tions, it is not obvious which globalization effects are mitigated. In the poor-South equilibrium, stricter
IPRP slows down Southern imitation, raises the relative Northern wage rate and decreases unemploy-
ment. In the rich-South equilibrium, two situations may arise: stricter IPRP either increases Southern
imitation (“IPRP paradox”) and decreases the relative Northern wage rate (this holds true for a large
Southern starting level of imitation) or the other way around (this holds true for a medium Southern
starting level of imitation). In both cases, the net effect on Northern unemployment is ambiguous.
Similarly, increasing labor market flexibility or decreasing firing costs in the North (while decreasing
obviously Northern unemployment) may be helpful to spur Northern growth temporarily, to reduce
competition from Southern imitation and thereby to raise the relative Northern wage rate. However,
these effects only occur in a poor-South equilibrium and are turned upside down in a rich-South equi-
librium.
These results let us conclude that if the North faces competition from a poor South, a more flexi-
ble Northern labor market and lower firing costs indeed would be useful instruments to attenuate the
negative globalization effects on Northern employment and its relative wage rate while speeding up
Northern innovation and growth at the same time. Moreover, this would be preferable to stricter IPRP
since the latter slows down Northern innovation and growth. However, if the North faces competition
from a (relatively) rich South, it is not clear whether globalization is bad at all for Northern employ-
ment and its relative wage rate. Furthermore, in this case, a more flexible Northern labor market or29
lower firing costs have the same qualitative effects as stricter IPRP on Southern imitation, Northern
innovation and growth, and the relative Northern wage rate.
Appendices
Appendix A: Derivation Of The Individual’s Consumption Demand Function (5)
With the definition of a new state variable Φ with Φ(0) = 0, Φ(1) = c(t) and dΦ(ω)/dω = p(ω, t)⋅d(ω, t),
the corresponding Hamiltonian is H = [λ
[j(ω, t)/(σ − 1)]⋅d(ω, t)]
(σ − 1)/σ + ψ(ω)⋅p(ω, t)⋅d(ω, t), where ψ(ω) is
the costate variable that belongs to Φ(ω). The f.o.c. are
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Inserting (A.2) into the budget constraint from (4) yields
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Using (A.3) in (A.2) then gives (5).
Appendix B: Proof That (44) Follows From (43), And Uniqueness Of {B
crit, C} Satisfying (44)
We first rewrite (44) as
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By solving (B.3) for B
crit, one immediately derives (43). Q.e.d.
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where the LHS is positive and the last term on the RHS is negative due to (43). Obviously, the LHS of
(B.4) is strictly decreasing in B
crit, while the RHS of (B.4) is strictly increasing in B
crit. Therefore, it
suffices to show that the RHS is strictly increasing in C (implying a strictly monotone negative rela-
tionship between B
crit and C as illustrated in panel B of Figure 1). Then, for given B
crit, only one value
of C can fulfill (B.4). To this aim, we rewrite the RHS of (B.4) as follows:
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where we have used (34). Hence, the RHS of (B.4) is strictly increasing in C. Q.e.d.
Appendix C: Derivation Of Equation (49)
Inserting (5) into (3) and using the fact the households only consume goods with the lowest quality-
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the facts that wS is a constant fraction of wN (see (47)) and that I and C are constant in a steady-state
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Inserting ċN/cN = ċ/c, (13), (29), (34), (14) and r = ρ into (C.2) gives (49).
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